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EMPIRICISM AND THE RISING
INCIDENCE OF COAUTHORSHIP
IN LAW'
Tom Ginsburg
Thomas J. Miles
The recent growth of empirical scholarship in law, which some
have termed "empirical legal studies," has received much attention. A
less-noticed implication of this trend is its potential impact on the
manner of scholarly production in legal academia. A common pre-
diction is that academic collaboration rises with scholarly specializa-
tion. As the complexity of a field grows, more human capital and
more diverse types of human capital are needed to make a contribu-
tion. This Article presents two tests of whether empiricism has
spurred more coauthorship in law. First, the Article shows that the
fraction of articles in the top fifteen law reviews that were empirical or
coauthored (or both) trended upwards between 2000 and 2010. The
increase in empirical articles accounted for a substantial share of the
growth in coauthored articles, and the correlation between coauthor-
ship and empiricism persisted after controlling for numerous other in-
fluences. Second, the Article examines the articles published since
1989 in two prominent, faculty-edited journals specializing in law and
economics: the Journal of Legal Studies and the Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization. Coauthored articles were far more
common in these journals than in the general interest, student-edited
law reviews-a pattern which itself is consistent with the specializa-
tion hypothesis. The share of articles without empirical analysis or
formal models in these journals plummeted over this period, while
coauthorship rose sharply. These results support the view that spe-
cialization, and specifically the growth of empirical scholarship, has
contributed to the trend of coauthorship in legal academia.
t Prepared for the panel on the "Future of Empirical Legal Studies," at the conference honor-
ing Professor Thomas S. Ulen, the University of Illinois College of Law, November 2010. The authors
thank Adam Cox, David Fontana, Mitu Gulati, William Landes, Brian Leiter, Eric Posner, and Lior
Strahilevitz for helpful conversations; Sarah Arendt, Greg Cheyne, Riley Lochridge, Michael Kup-
persmith, and Kyle Poelker for research assistance; Dean Ann Perry for personnel management; and
Northwestern University Law Library for granting access to its physical volumes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peanut butter and jelly. Abbott and Costello. Hall and Oates.
Cooter and Ulen. History is replete with great partnerships where the
whole seems to exceed the sum of the parts. What is it that makes a
great partnership in legal scholarship? This Article sets out to under-
stand the determinants of coauthorship in law.
Legal scholarship, of course, is a subset of scholarship in general,
and there is wide variation across disciplines and over time in scholarly
collaboration. Historically, most scientific writing in all fields was sole
authored until the mid-twentieth century.' Since then, many fields have
witnessed an increase in the frequency of coauthorship. As coauthorship
has burgeoned, so too has a literature on the causes, consequences, and
ethics of coauthorship.2 Much of this literature focuses on the discipline
of economics, but attention has recently turned to the incidence of coau-
thorship in law.3 Casual empiricism, and earlier studies, suggest an ap-
parent trend toward coauthorship in law, notwithstanding early advice to
younger scholars not to coauthor.' The causes and implications of the
trend are not fully understood. In particular, the role of interdisciplinary
scholarship, such as law and economics, and empirical work in driving
the trend toward coauthorship has not been analyzed.
In this Article we set out to understand the determinants of coau-
thorship in legal scholarship and we give particular attention to the influ-
ence of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, including empirical legal stu-
dies. In Part II, we review the existing theories of academic
collaboration, and we draw out the empirical implications for legal aca-
demics. A key prediction of this literature is that intellectual collabora-
tion rises with scholarly specialization. As knowledge grows, a subject
may become increasingly complex, and greater and more specific intel-
lectual inputs may be necessary to make a contribution. The likelihood
that a single person possesses all of the human capital necessary to pro-
duce a contribution falls and collaboration rises. In effect, collaboration
1. Larry D. Claxton, Scientific Authorship: Part 2-History, Recurring Issues, Practices, and
Guidelines, 589 MUTATION RES. 31, 33 (2005); Mott Greene, The Demise of the Lone Author, 450
NATURE 1165,1165 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Jason W. Osborne & Abigail Holland, What Is Authorship, and What Should It Be?
A Survey of Prominent Guidelines for Determining Authorship in Scientific Publications, 14 PRAC.
ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION, no. 15, July 2009, at 1.
3. E.g., Paul H. Edelman & Tracey E. George, Six Degrees of Cass Sunstein: Collaboration
Networks in Legal Scholarship, 11 GREEN BAG 2D, fall 2007, at 19 (hereinafter Edelmen & George,
Six Degrees); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Joining Forces: The Role of Collaboration in the De-
velopment of Legal Thought, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 559 (2002); see also Paul H. Edelman & Tracey E.
George, Sunstein Is and 2s, in THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER 473 (Ross E. Davies ed., 2008)
(hereinafter Edelman & George, Sunstein Is and 2s).
4. Robert H. Abrams, Sing Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1, 6 (1987) (arguing that young legal scholars should not coauthor because of concerns about shared
credit and increased time required).
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represents a greater division of labor as the size of the scholarly "mar-
ket" grows.
In legal scholarship, interdisciplinary work tends to be more special-
ized than general legal scholarship because it draws on a different aca-
demic literature and it often applies unfamiliar methodologies. Among
interdisciplinary approaches in law, empiricism appears particularly spe-
cialized relative to more conventional legal scholarship. Quantitative
analysis has historically not been part of legal curriculum, and even now,
it is rare for a legal academic to have graduate training in these methods.
A plausible prediction is that by virtue of its higher degree of specializa-
tion, interdisciplinary, and particularly empirical, work will more often
be collaborative than general legal scholarship.
We test this prediction by examining patterns of coauthorship in
two sets of legal academic publications. First, in Part IV, we examine all
articles published in the "top fifteen" law reviews between 2000 and
2010. We find wide variation across these reviews in the incidence of
coauthored and interdisciplinary articles. We confirm the patterns that
other investigators have detected in subsamples of these reviews: the
presence of upward trends in coauthorship and empiricism in legal aca-
demia. These parallel trends provide initial support for the specializa-
tion hypothesis. As a further test, we examine whether the correlation
between coauthorship and empiricism persists after controlling for other
influences, and we find that it does. The increase in empirical articles ac-
counts for a substantial share of the growth in coauthored articles.
In Part V, we examine two prominent faculty-edited journals spe-
cializing in law and economics: the Journal of Legal Studies (JLS) and
the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (JLEO). We focus on
these journals because they offer a long-time series, and they are bell-
wethers of mainstream law and economics scholarship. Coauthored ar-
ticles are far more common in these journals than in the general interest,
student-edited law reviews, a fact which itself is consistent with the spe-
cialization hypothesis. Strikingly, the data shows that the share of non-
technical articles in these journals has plummeted since 1989. With the
expansion of empiricism and formal modeling in these journals, coau-
thorship has risen substantially. These results strongly support the view
that specialization, and specifically the demand for empirical legal schol-
arship, has contributed to the coauthorship trend in law.
A second prediction of the literature on intellectual collaboration is
that as the opportunity cost of a scholar's time rises, the implicit price of
5. Edelman & George, Six Degrees, supra note 3, at 27-31 (coauthorship); Theodore Eisenberg,
The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1713, 1713-14 (empiricism); George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 561-63 (coauthorship); Mi-
chael Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1742; Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law
Reviews, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Se. 581, 582 (2010) (empiricism).
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collaborating with the scholar increases. For example, a colleague who
previously may have been satisfied with an acknowledgment in the "dag-
ger footnote" for his or her comments on a draft may instead demand
coauthorship credit. We call this the compensation theory of coauthor-
ship. The advent of empirical legal studies increased the value of empiri-
cal skills in legal academia and thereby improved the bargaining position
of empiricists. Although we do not test the prediction that acknowl-
edgement credits will be elevated into coauthorship, we test a related hy-
pothesis about the compensation of collaborators. When the value of a
coauthor's contribution increases, he or she might demand deviation
from the norm of alphabetical ordering of authors. A more prominent
placement of a scholar's name would signal the importance of his or her
scholarly input. We examine deviations from the alphabetical ordering
of names in coauthored papers. Among both the law reviews and the
faculty-edited journals, we find some evidence that these deviations are
more common for empirical papers than for other papers. The devia-
tions from alphabetic ordering do not appear to reflect the influence of
another discipline's norm of nonalphabetic ordering. The discipline of
economics, the field which has been a wellspring of legal empiricism, fol-
lows the alphabetic norm, and there is no evidence of deviation from the
norm for articles involving formal mathematical models.
The results suggest that legal scholarship in the past decade has un-
dergone an unprecedented transformation marked by the rapid growth
of interdisciplinary, especially empirical, work. This Article builds on the
work of prior investigators in documenting this pattern. But what has
heretofore gone relatively unnoticed is that this shift in legal output is al-
so accompanied by a change in the means of scholarly production. A le-
gal empiricist, in contrast to the more traditional faculty member who la-
bors in isolation, is likely to produce scholarship through a partnership.
In Part VI, this Article advances some conjectures on some broader con-
sequences of this shift for legal academia.
II. WHY COAUTHOR?
A. Leading Theories and Additional Considerations
The question of what drives scholarly collaboration is not new. The
literature has identified four leading factors that influence the decision to
coauthor. The first is the increased complexity of scientific fields with as-
sociated demands for specialization. This is partly driven by scientific
progress, but also a result of the labor conditions for researchers. As
higher education enrollments and budgets have expanded, so have pro-
fessors. The need for research faculty to carve out a distinctive niche for
their scholarly careers has led to more specialization, requiring collabora-
1788 [Vol. 2011
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tion to produce research of publishable quality.6 The distinctive skills of
a collaborator may permit an academic to produce work that he or she
would not be able to produce individually. Two authors with different
specialties are likely to play a complementary role in a team production
function. This perspective, which we call the complementarity theory of
coauthorship, predicts a continuous, and possibly accelerating, trend to-
ward collaboration.
A second theory treats coauthorship as a means of compensating
colleagues for input. The opportunity cost of a scholar's time has in-
creased, raising the market price of presubmission comments on manu-
scripts from colleagues. An often-cited possibility is that colleagues who
would formerly be willing to provide uncompensated comments on man-
uscripts now must be offered coauthorship credit in return for their con-
structive comments.' An analogous prediction is that a colleague's input
may be so valuable that he or she garners a lead authorship as a public
acknowledgement of the importance of his or her contribution. We call
this theory, developed in the study of coauthorship in the economics dis-
cipline, the compensation account of scholarly collaboration. It empha-
sizes the collective nature of scholarly production but does not imply any
increase in quality relative to the former equilibrium of sole-authorship
with uncompensated input from colleagues.8 Rather, it is a prediction of
how the rewards of intellectual teamwork will be distributed. When a
certain input becomes more valuable, it will command a higher (implicit)
price.
A third possibility is that quality may be enhanced through coau-
thored work. Collaboration may improve quality when there are increas-
ing returns to specialization, as conjectured above under complementary
theory. In addition to joint contributions to production brought by
people with different scholarly profiles, coauthors might increase a read-
er's assessment of its reliability. If the conditions for the Condorcet jury
theorem apply, more coauthors would indicate that more people thought
the article was worth claiming (partial) credit for.' It also means, pre-
sumably, that multiple authors have carefully evaluated the data and ar-
gument. For a journal editor, this is a signal of quality-not one but two
6. Andy H. Barnett, Richard W. Ault & David L. Kaserman, The Rising Incidence of Co-
Authorship in Economics: Further Evidence, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 539 (1988); John M. McDowell &
Michael Melvin, The Determinants of Co-Authorship: An Analysis of the Economics Literature, 65
REv. ECON. & STAT. 155 (1983); Stefan Wuchty, Benjamin F. Jones & Brian Uzzi, The Increasing
Dominance of Teams in the Production of Knowledge, 316 SCIENCE 1036,1038 (2007).
7. Barnett, Ault & Kaserman, supra note 6; see also David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison,
Intellectual Collaboration, 108 J. POL. EcoN. 632 (2000) (emphasizing multiple forms of collaboration
besides coauthorship).
8. Compensation theory can be seen as consistent with the complementarity theory, as it simply
describes the division of credit between two producers of a collaborative product. Collaborative work
of constant quality now merits coauthorship as a price for inducing the second producer to contribute,
whereas it would not have in an earlier era.
9. See generally Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002).
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or more authors are willing to stake their reputation on the accuracy and
quality of the paper. This should lead to higher quality research, ceteris
paribus. Indeed, there is some evidence from economics that coauthor-
ship leads to output of better quality."o
A fourth prominent explanation for collaboration relates to the un-
certainty of the editorial review process. Having two authors review a
manuscript and provide input might make for a better article. But even
if collaboration does not improve the quality of the scholarship, it facili-
tates market saturation by having two people working in closely aligned
fields." Diversification reduces the risk of rejection from journals and is
particularly attractive given relatively short tenure clocks and relatively
long journal review periods. It also may increase the chances of a
"home-run" article, if academic influence is distributed with a long right
tail. If the number of articles exerting a large scholarly influence is small,
the chance of writing a high-impact article may be increased by writing
many articles. Coauthorship may allow a scholar to increase the number
of articles he or she writes or cowrites. This diversification theory em-
phasizes strategic benefits in the decision to coauthor, even when collab-
oration implies no increase in quality relative to sole-authored work.
None of these theories from the literature has been definitively ac-
cepted and empirical tests are rare. 2 These theories address the benefits
of collaboration or the distribution of the benefits between coauthors.
The costs of collaboration have received less attention, but they warrant
mentioning. Perhaps the first of these is the cost of finding a scholarly
match. The increase in the size of the academic profession in recent
years means that there is a larger pool from which to find suitable coau-
thors' and the impact of this growth on the cost of collaborating is am-
biguous. A larger pool may reduce the cost of collaborating because it
raises the likelihood that there exists an academic with a particular spe-
cialty and hence, a better match. At the same time, the larger pool from
which to choose a collaborator may raise the search cost of finding the
well-suited academic partner.
Perhaps the most obvious cost of coauthorship is the time and ener-
gy expended managing the partnership, which we call coordination costs.
10. See Garey C. Durden & Timothy J. Perri, Coauthorship and Publication Efficiency, 23 AM.
ECON. J. 69 (1995) (finding that coauthorship enhances productivity in total and per capita article pro-
duction); see also Raymond D. Sauer, Estimates of the Returns to Quality and Coauthorship in Eco-
nomic Academia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 855 (1988) (finding that collaboration through formal coauthorship
increases the quantity or quality or both of one's professional productivity, which has market value);
Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher, Patterns of Co-Authorship Among Economics Departments in the
USA, 36 APPLIED ECON. 327 (2004) (finding that quality of coauthors' institutions, measured by rank-
ings of institutions, has a significant impact on the number of coauthored papers in top economics
journals).
11. Barnett, Ault & Kaserman, supra note 6, at 540.
12. See Durden & Perri, supra note 10.
13. See John Hudson, Trends in Multi-Authored Papers in Economics, 10 J. ECoN. PERSP., no.3,
1996, at 153.
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These costs include direct expenditures such as telephone calls and trav-
eling for meetings. They also include intellectual efforts such as review-
ing and editing one another's work and integrating disparate parts of an
article.14 Technological advances have surely lowered these costs. Word
processing features such as "track changes" ease the process of writing.
A consequence of email and the internet is that the geographic proximity
of a collaborator is much less relevant than in the past.
Less directly observable are the costs of reaching an agreement on
the substance of the article or the structure of its argument. Part of this
cost is incurred up-front in the decision to form a scholarly partnership.
The collaborators must have an initial agreement on the aims and scope
of the research project and a plan for the division of labor. Negotiation
over objectives and duties may be costly. As the collaboration
progresses, unexpected obstacles may be encountered and unanticipated
results emerge. Differences of opinion as to the direction of the research
effort may develop, and it may be necessary for coauthors to engage in
explicit renegotiation over which research claims will be advanced and
how responsibilities will be divided. In the extreme, when collaborators
cannot reach an agreement, it may imply the dissolution of the research
partnership. It is not obvious whether technological changes raise or
lower the likelihood of disagreements between a given set of authors.
But it is possible that technology may facilitate the sorting of potential
collaborators such that the members of resulting partnerships are better
matched, thus reducing the likelihood of subsequent disagreements.
An additional cost of collaboration is the familiar agency problem.
A collaboration is a partnership, and when a partner's contribution re-
quires costly effort, the partner may contribute less than promised or ex-
pected. To curtail free riding off the efforts of others, members of the
collaboration must monitor each other's contributions. Yet monitoring
itself is costly, and in some instances, it may not be possible because of
unobservability or unverifiability. Collaborators may be geographically
distant, and even when physically proximate, it is unlikely they directly
observe how much effort each is contributing. Even if labor hours were
known, it may be hard for a collaborator to assess the effort entailed in a
partner's contribution. Imagine a collaboration between a physicist and
a poet. The physicist likely cannot judge whether the few lines of haiku
contributed were tossed off quickly or the product of deep reflection and
arduous burnishing. As interdisciplinary collaborations often join to-
gether scholars with divergent skill sets, the trend toward interdisciplin-
ary scholarship in law may expand the incidence of agency problems in
coauthorships in legal academia.
Another cost of collaboration is the diminution of credit. The in-
puts of author effort are not directly observed, and consequently, outsid-
14. Abrams, supra note 4, at 6 ("Integrating two people's work into a single cohesive product
consumes additional hours.").
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ers cannot easily tell which author contributed the most to an article or a
book. A common rule of thumb is to divide credit equally among coau-
thors. Thus, each author of a paper of quality Q will be assigned Q/n of
credit, where n is the number of coauthors." Although we do not ob-
serve directly the rewards to scholarship or the efforts of authors, this
rule of thumb has immediate implications for the relationship between
inputs and payoffs of collaboration. For example, in order to make it
worthwhile for an author to invest the same amount of effort in an article
with n-1 coauthors as he or she would in a single authored article, the to-
tal payoffs to the coauthored article must equal or exceed, by a factor of
n, the average payoff of the sole-authored paper. Alternatively, if the
payoff to an author of joining a collaboration with n-1 coauthors is less
than I/nth of a solo-authored article, the author's contribution (in terms
of effort or time) must be less than I/nth that of a solo-authored article.
As effort and payoffs are not directly observable, we cannot tell which of
these possibilities (coauthoring earns higher rewards) or (coauthoring
requires less effort) occurs most often.
A caveat is that an unequal division of credit among coauthors may
be unavoidable. A strong norm is to refer to collaborations of two au-
thors by listing their names (e.g., Cooter and Ulen). But when the num-
ber of collaborators is greater than two, the tendency is to refer to the
collaborators by the name of the first author with all other coauthors
tucked into the catchall phrase "et al." (e.g., Black et al.)."6 In this appel-
lation, only the lead author's name is mentioned, and he or she may re-
ceive a disproportionate amount of the publicity and reputational benefit
of the collaboration. A very small number of collaborations have suc-
cessfully acquired designations that reflect a relatively equal crediting of
authors, such as abbreviations (e.g., LLSV) or Esperanto-like acronyms
(e.g., "McNollgast")." But these instances are rare. The relative penalty
of having one's name disappear into an "et al." tag offers another reason
15. James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REv 781, 793 (1996) (giving fractional credit to each coauthor).
16. For example, when citing Bernard Black, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & William M.
Sage, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005) and Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David A. Hyman & Wil-
liam M. Sage, Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed
Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD., no. S2, 2007, at S9, the authors could be listed as "Black et al."
and "Zeiler et al.," respectively.
17. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Owner-
ship Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (hereinafter Corporate Ownership); Rafael La Porta, Flo-
rencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998) (hereinafter Law and Finance); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Wein-
gast, Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987);
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180
(1999).
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why coauthorships in law are almost entirely pairings rather than larger
combinations.18
Coordination costs and credit diminution create a potential adverse
selection problem. It is unlikely that any partnership enjoys a perfectly
equitable division of labor (and the coordination costs of ensuring that it
does would be very high). A consequence is that Q/n of credit overcom-
pensates some members of a collaboration for their contributions. The
pool of potential coauthors may contain a higher number of slackers than
the overall academic population. This could lead to less overall effort
being put into coauthored papers. One solution is to coauthor repeated-
ly with the same partners, which makes it likely that any inequalities on a
particular project will even out over time. Repeated interactions may
enhance the ability of coauthors to monitor each other's effort. This so-
lution also means that the partners can develop a joint reputation, raising
the external assessment of Q relative to their sole-authored work. This
would help overcome any moral hazard problems that arise after a part-
nership has begun." A reason to doubt the severity of any adverse selec-
tion problem is that for every slacking academic who seeks a coauthor-
ship, there must be a partner willing to furnish inputs for less than a
proportionate share of the rewards. An academic anticipating that he or
she would be shortchanged in this manner would decline to collaborate.
A key prediction of the canonical adverse selection model is that the fear
of disadvantageous trades would create a vicious cycle resulting in the
unraveling of the "lemons market."2 0 Over time the number of willing,
high-quality authors would decline. As we observe the incidence of col-
laboration rising rather than declining, we doubt that adverse selection
problems in legal academia are severe. Moreover, many coauthored
works are undoubtedly of very high quality, including some of the most
respected and influential contributions in law and in law and economics.21
This discussion has alluded to the fact that most collaborations
comprise two scholars but others involve more. We do not offer a sharp
prediction on the optimal number of coauthors, but many of the consid-
erations mentioned above are directly relevant. For example, coordina-
tion costs may increase dramatically, possibly even exponentially, as the
number of coauthors rises. In a group of three, each coauthor must mon-
18. This suggests that bluebook citing conventions might impact coauthorship practices. We do
not test this proposition in this article. Further work might examine the covariance of disciplinary cita-
tion practices with coauthorship rates.
19. We expect that the pattern of coauthor relationships over time bears further examination
from this perspective. A long-term coauthoring relationship probably implies declining marginal
coordination costs over time; on the other hand, there may be also be declining marginal returns to the
relationship as complementarities get exploited.
20. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
21. Prominent partnerships in law and economics include William Landes and Richard Posner,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, and Mitch Polinsky and Ste-
ven Shavell.
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itor two others; and if a potential slacker is identified, the two reliable
coauthors must decide who will enforce the coauthorship norms. This
may explain why the modal number of authors on a coauthored paper is
two, yet disciplinary norms in this regard vary. In psychology, for exam-
ple, a paper with multiple coauthors is the norm.22
We readily acknowledge that we do not have a generally accepted
theory about what academics seek to maximize. 23 The complementarity
theory described above implicitly assumes that scholars maximize quality
of output. If producing better work requires coauthorship, then academ-
ics will coauthor. Diversification theory, on the other hand, assumes that
academics maximize reputational payoff, which might be only loosely
correlated with actual quality. Reputation might be enhanced by the
sheer number of publications produced. In this case, coauthoring might
expand the number of lines on a scholar's resume, and at the same time,
it may make it difficult for external assessors of outputs, such as academ-
ic deans and departments, to evaluate the individual contribution. Sup-
pose, alternatively, that academics seek to maximize leisure, which would
motivate them to claim credit for as much work as they can produce for
as little effort as possible. As noted above, collaboration allows free rid-
ing and the increase in coauthorship may reflect greater leisure consump-
tion. The difficult task of identifying the preferences of academics lies
beyond the scope of this paper, but we recognize that our results raise
these questions.
B. Implications for Interdisciplinary Scholarship in Law
What do these theories suggest about the role of interdisciplinarity
and specialization as drivers of coauthorship in legal scholarship? Con-
sider first the complementarity theory that suggests, in part, the increase
in specialized technical skills required in a particular area is likely to in-
crease the demand for coauthorship. By bringing together knowledge
from different fields, interdisciplinary work requires a diverse set of
skills. It is costly for a single individual to acquire all the necessary skills,
and collaboration may be more convenient among two or more individu-
als when each of them furnishes a different skill. Some disciplines have
seen significant increases in technical specialization associated with the
rise of modern computing and statistics programs. Other disciplines have
not. It is perhaps unsurprising that Guthrie and George show that coau-
22. E.g., Heather J. Smith, Tom R. Tyler, Yuen J. Huo, Daniel J. Ortiz & E. Allan Lind, The
Self-Relevant Implications of the Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment
Quality, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 470 (1998); Tom R. Tyler, Lawrence Sherman, Heather
Strang, Geoffrey C. Barnes & Daniel Woods, Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidi-
vism: The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-
Driving Experiment, 41 L. & Soc'Y REv. 553 (2007); see also George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 567
("[R]oughly a quarter of social science collaborations involved three or more authors . .. .").
23. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 1 (1993).
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thorship rates in elite law reviews are higher than those in humanities
journals in philosophy, English, and history, but are lower than those in
psychology, economics, sociology, or political science.24 The latter disci-
plines rely heavily on statistics, while the tools of philosophy, English,
and history have not changed in any fundamental way. Thus, technologi-
cal change contributes to the increased gains from cooperation in certain
disciplines and not others.
Law falls somewhere in the middle of this disciplinary spectrum.
Historically, law was closer to the humanities end of the technological
spectrum than the social science end. For example, George and Guthrie
report that from 1970-1999, coauthored work comprised fifteen percent
of law review articles.25 This contrasts with more than sixty percent of
social science articles in leading journals.26
But legal academia is changing. First, there has been a trend toward
socio-legal and interdisciplinary scholarship. More and more entry-level
candidates have PhDs in social sciences like economics or political
science. These scholars are trained in technical methods, and may bring
with them norms of coauthorship from other disciplines. Furthermore,
there are natural gains from collaboration because the new PhDs have
skills that older legal scholars lacked, while older scholars have more ex-
perience and knowledge of law. Although it is beyond the scope of this
paper, we suspect that the increase in coauthorship in law is partly due to
a wider diversity of academic training and consequently skill sets on law
faculties.
As interdisciplinary fields (such as law and economics) mature, a
contribution that makes an advance over existing knowledge requires an
ever greater degree of technical proficiency. This intensifies the incen-
tives for coauthorship because when a scholar lacks knowledge of a rele-
vant field, an offer of coauthorship credit may be necessary to induce a
colleague to provide input on a research project. Authors possessing es-
pecially valuable skill sets may even demand that their names appear
first in the sequence of authors, deviating from the norm of alphabetic
ordering. More technical sophistication raises the value of collaboration
and hence the "price" of careful, time-consuming comments to a col-
league that may rise to coauthorship credit. On the whole, compensation
theory may explain any contribution of interdisciplinary and empirical
work to the increase in coauthorship.
The quality theory, on the other hand, does not appear to offer as
strong an incentive for coauthorship in empirical work as does skill com-
plementarity. If technical complexity alone is the driver of coauthorship,
we ought to observe an increase in coauthorship in some areas of law and
24. George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 564-68.
25. See id. at 562.
26. Id. at 566. Durden and Perri report an estimate that by 1985, fifty-two percent of published
articles in economics were coauthored. Durden & Perri, supra note 10, at 69.
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not others. After all, there is considerable variation in the degree of
complexity across subjects in law. Tax law, for example, is often consid-
ered highly complex. If technical complexity alone was driving coauthor-
ship, rates of coauthorship in complex legal fields such as tax should rise.
In contrast, if increasing returns from cross-disciplinary work are driving
the coauthorship phenomenon, increases in coauthorship should be con-
centrated in empirical and interdisciplinary work.
Similarly, diversification theory does not seem to have special sa-
lience for interdisciplinary work. Collaboration may allow an academic
to manage more effectively the risks of scholarship by trimming the
downside risks and expanding upside gains. A collaborator may act as a
de facto reviewer or editor and thus reduce the risks of rejection from
journals. But, this rationale seemingly applies to all forms of legal
scholarship and is not limited to, or uniquely applicable to, empirical or
interdisciplinary work.
Collaboration provides the opportunity to free ride off the efforts of
others. This opportunity may be greater in interdisciplinary work as
monitoring is less effective when a scholar lacks proficiency in a collabo-
rator's field. As the respective skills of collaborators become more spe-
cialized, each is less equipped to assess the (labor or effort) cost of the
other's contribution, and the inability to monitor may provide greater
opportunities for shirking. But we have no reason to think that the pool
of scholars producing interdisciplinary and empirical work is more likely
to be motivated by consumption of leisure than are other legal scholars.
To the extent that authors of interdisciplinary and empirical work may
include people who have spent years getting a PhD, sometimes in addi-
tion to a JD degree, one might presume the opposite-these coauthors
have sent a costly signal of willingness to work hard and invest in novel
skills.
To summarize, all of the various theories of coauthorship that we
outlined above appear relevant to coauthorships in law. Yet, comple-
mentarity theory predicts a particularly strong relationship between col-
laboration and the growth of empirical and interdisciplinary scholarship.
We might also expect compensation theory to have some explanatory
power, and a prediction is that among coauthored articles, empirical
pieces will be more likely to deviate from the alphabetic ordering of au-
thors. In contrast, the quality, diversification, or leisure consumption
theories may be relevant, but they do not offer an account as to why in-
terdisciplinary scholarship, especially empirical work, would be accom-
panied by greater incidence of coauthorships.
[Vol. 20111796
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III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We examine two sets of data located through the ISI-Web of
ScienceTM. First, are all articles published in the top fifteen law reviews
during 2000-2010.27 Second, are all articles published in two faculty-
edited interdisciplinary journals, JLS and JLEO, during the period 1989-
2010.28 Our predictions that interdisciplinarity, particularly empiricism,
may influence coauthorship necessitated examination of both data
sources. We chose to examine both student- and faculty-edited journals
in order to have confidence that we were capturing trends in interdisci-
plinary scholarship rather than epiphenomena of particular journal mar-
kets.
We examined the top fifteen law reviews rather than limiting our at-
tention to a few top law reviews in order to assess coauthorship practices
in a large swath of legal academia.2 1 We chose ILS and JLEO because
they are influential interdisciplinary journals with long histories. Their
age provides the opportunity to look at patterns in scholarship over a
relatively long time horizon-two decades.3 0 An additional consideration
was the position these journals occupy at the intersection of law and so-
cial science, particularly economics. Another highly regarded interdis-
ciplinary journal with a long history, the Journal of Law & Economics,
tilts more clearly in the direction of economics than law, and for decades
it has regularly published sophisticated empirical work.31 In contrast, we
believe JLS and JLEO are bellwethers of trends in interdisciplinary legal
scholarship, particularly law and economics. Our sample includes 7540
items published in law reviews, including 2785 major articles, and 1030
articles in the two peer-reviewed journals.
We define coauthorship in the same manner as Edelman and
George. 2 Their criteria is that a coauthor is any individual listed in the
"by" line along with at least one other person. This excludes contribu-
tors identified as "with" as well as editors or those in a footnote. Articles
can, of course, have multiple coauthors. This definition is intuitive and is
consistent with the economics literature on coauthorship. From the ISI-
Web of ScienceTM, we generated citation reports for each article in our
27. Definitions of "top" are inherently arbitrary. We define the top fifteen law reviews as com-
prising Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Stanford Law Review, University of Chicago Law Re-
view, Columbia Law Review, New York University Law Review, Michigan Law Review, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Virginia Law Review, Cornell Law Review, California Law Review, Duke
Law Journal, Northwestern University Law Review, Texas Law Review, and Georgetown Law Journal.
28. For another study of empirical work in the JLS, see William M. Landes, The Empirical Side
of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 167 (2003).
29. Contra Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law
Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2000) (looking at articles only from Harvard Law Review, Stanford
Law Review, and Yale Law Journal).
30. For this reason, we chose not to examine American Law & Economics Review (ALER) and
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS), which are influential but of more recent provenance.
31. Landes, supra note 28, at 171-72.
32. George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 561.
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data. A limitation of this source is that its coverage of citations in social
science journals is more extensive than its coverage of citations in law re-
views.33 For this reason, the results may be biased in the direction of fa-
voring articles of interest to social scientists. If so, articles of greater in-
terest to social scientists, such as those containing formal models and
empirical analyses, might have higher-than-average citation rates. But,
as we shall show in Part V, this is not the case, and this pattern suggests
that any bias arising from the use of this citation data base rather than a
legal data base appears modest.
We coded each article for its legal subject and methodology based
on a brief inspection of the physical volume. Our subject categories
were: corporate/securities law, criminal law, international/comparative
law, private/commercial law, and other public law. For the faculty-edited
journals, we expanded this to include another category, which we called
"other," to encompass articles that addressed economic behavior gener-
ally and not specific to any area of law. With regard to methodology, we
were particularly interested in the presence of the two technical methods
most common to law and economics: empirical methods and formal
mathematical models. We counted an article as empirical if it presented
a novel analysis of data. We excluded from this category articles that
merely reproduced tables or figures which had previously been published
elsewhere, such as in a government report. We coded an article as con-
taining a formal mathematical model if it had at least one numbered
equation. To provide a contrast with other types of interdisciplinary
scholarship, we attempted to code articles that were methodologically
humanities oriented, such as law and literature, philosophy, and legal his-
tory. These techniques are less evident upon inspection, and therefore,
we strongly suspect that we undercounted, perhaps severely, the pres-
ence of humanities-oriented interdisciplinary work.
We examine these data in summary statistics, and then we turn to
multiple regression analysis to control for numerous possible influences
on coauthorship. Specifically, we estimate the probability that an article
is coauthored in an equation of the form:
Pr(Yit) = nethod subject i type yil positionpim T
where Yi, is an indicator variable that takes the value one when article i
published in year t is coauthored and zero otherwise. We focus on col-
laboration as a binary choice because we observe relatively little varia-
tion in the size of coauthorship teams. The vector X, contains contin-
uous characteristics of the article, including its (log) page length and the
average number of citations per year it has received since publication.
For the faculty-edited journals, we collected a richer set of article charac-
teristics, including the number of figures, whether it includes an appen-
dix, the number of tables in an empirical article, and a count of the num-
33. Citations by courts are not recorded.
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bered equations in an article with a formal model. As we show below,
the faculty-edited journals featured more technical articles, and we
gathered these variables to capture more of the variation in technological
T
sophistication of those articles.4 The term a t, is a coefficient on a time
trend, t, and because fluctuations in the propensity to coauthor may not
vary linearly with time, this term is replaced in some specifications with
fixed effects for the year of publication. The remaining explanatory var-
iables are indicator variables. The ay terms are a series of binary var-
iables for law review article i's methodology: whether it is empirical, con-
tains a formal model, or appears to be humanities oriented. An article
employing conventional legal analysis is the omitted category of meth-
odology. The terms 3 ik are binary variables for the subject matter of the
article: criminal law, international/comparative law, private/commercial
law, other public law, and for faculty-edited journals, the category of
"other." Articles in corporate/securities law are the omitted category for
subject. The terms yti measure the type of law review article: student
note or comment, book review, tribute or memorial, and symposium ar-
ticle. The final set of indicator variables, pi,,,, measures the "running or-
der" of the article in each volume and issue. They consist of binary var-
iables for whether the article appeared first in a volume or first in an is-
sue. Lastly, e;, is an error term.
We estimate a similar equation in examining the alphabetical order-
ing of authors with collaborative articles. There, the sample is restricted
to coauthored articles, and the dependent variable is the probability that
coauthored article has an ordering of last names that deviates from the
alphabetical ordering. The same set of control variables is included in
those equations.
34. We believe that the count of equations for articles with formal models is a noisy measure of a
model's sophistication. Articles are not consistent in their numbering conventions. Some articles
number only a subset of the equations they include, and this tendency appears particularly pro-
nounced for game theoretic articles.
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A. Summary Data
TABLE 1:
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON ARTICLES
IN TOP FIFTEEN LAW REVIEWS, 2000-2010
All Articles Major Articles Only
(1) (2)
Coauthored .121 .201
(.326) (.401)
Empirical .053 .094
(.225) (.292)
Formal Theory .021 .035
(.144) (.185)
Humanities .033 .053
(.180) (.223)
(Log) Page Length 3.453 3.938
(.837) (.624)
First in Volume .021 .043
(.144) (.203)
First in Issue .084 .173
(.278) (.378)
Tribute .034 --
(.182)
Symposium .286 --
(.452)
Book Review .090 --
(.287)
Student Note or Comment .290 --
(.454)
Corporate/Securities Law .051 .060
(.220) (.237)
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TABLE 1- Continued
Criminal Law .102 .093
(.303) (.290)
International / Comparative .059 .061
Law (.236) (.239)
Private / Commercial Law .195 .230
(.391) (.421)
Public Law .592 .556
(.481) (.497)
Time Trend 5.692 5.846
(3.085) (3.104)
Citations per Year 1.061 1.931
(1.1697) (2.197)
N 7540 2785
Note: The columns report means and in parentheses standard deviations. "Major articles"
excludes student notes and comments, book reviews, tributes and memorials, and sympo-
sium articles.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the law reviews. It presents
two cuts of the data: column (1) includes all the articles published and
column (2) includes only "major articles." Excluded from the category
of major articles are book reviews, student notes and comments, tributes
and memorials, and symposium pieces. As column (1) shows, these other
types of publications compose seventy-three percent of the items pub-
lished in the law reviews. There are strong reasons to treat these other
types of publications differently. First, authors of major articles tend to
be faculty while students usually write notes and comments. The primary
purpose of notes and comments is arguably pedagogical rather than
scholarly. Book reviews are arguably different as well. Although they
can approximate a full article in length and scope, their purpose is to re-
view an existing work rather than to make a stand-alone contribution.
Tributes and memorials also serve a different purpose. They often lack
scholarly content, and even when they include such content, it is often a
summation of the honoree's prior work rather than a novel, independent
contribution. They sometimes contain personal reminiscences, and they
tend to be brief. Articles appearing in symposiums are a harder call, but
here we treat them as separate from major articles. Symposium publica-
tions usually result from invitations rather than the submission process
governing regular issues, and they tend to be shorter than major articles.
It is also doubtful whether a symposium contribution carries the same
heft in a junior scholar's tenure evaluation as a major article does. We
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tend to think it does not, and for that reason, we treat law review sympo-
siums as different from major articles.
Table 1 shows that major articles differ from the other categories of
publication across several dimensions. The incidence of coauthorship
nearly doubles when the data are limited to major articles. This pattern
is consistent with the fact that student notes and comments are nearly
always single authored. Table 1 shows that among major articles, nearly
twenty percent were coauthored during the decade. This aggregate fig-
ure masks considerable temporal movements in coauthorship during the
decade." Figure 1 shows the fraction of major articles in law reviews that
were coauthored by year. The time series do not show a monotonic in-
crease, but an upward trend in coauthorship can be detected. In 2000,
fifteen percent of major articles were coauthored, and by 2010, this figure
was twenty-three percent.
FIGURE 1:
TRENDS IN EMPIRICISM AND COAUTHORSHIP
AT MAJOR LAW REVIEWS, 2000-2010
0.30
0.25
0.20
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0.10 do % do 00d
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Although not reported here, the growth in coauthorship has not
been accompanied by an increase in the number of authors on each coau-
thored article. Of the coauthored articles, eighty-six percent had two au-
thors, nearly eleven percent had three authors, and about three percent
had three or more authors. While there is some year-to-year fluctuation
in the size of coauthorships, there is no pronounced upward trend favor-
ing larger collaborations. In other words, the growth in coauthorships in
these law reviews is an expansion along the extensive rather than inten-
35. The rate represents a fifteen percent increase for law reviews from the findings of George
and Guthrie. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 562.
0.35
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sive margin. The modal number of collaborators is two, a pattern that
contrasts sharply with the norms in the physical sciences, where it is
common to list all members of a laboratory's research team as authors.
Major articles and other categories of publication also differ in the
frequency with which they employ interdisciplinary methodologies. Ma-
jor law review articles boast rates of empirical, formal theory, where hu-
manities approaches are roughly double the rates for all items published
in law reviews. This is perhaps unsurprising because the different types
of items published in law reviews tend to follow varying conventions. A
purpose of a student note or comment is to demonstrate command of
law, and law students, whose immediate academic aim is to master the
law, are less likely to possess the training necessary to produce interdis-
ciplinary work. Book reviews and tributes tend to follow the essay form
and survey existing work rather than introduce novel analysis. Sympo-
sium pieces are also less likely to be interdisciplinary, perhaps because
the restriction of topic or the fixed time frames of symposiums restrict
opportunities to employ other methodologies.
While interdisciplinary work in law reviews appears almost exclu-
sively in the form of major articles, it remains a relatively small share of
this category of publication. Our measures of interdisciplinarity suggest
that articles using such methodologies constitute only a small fraction-
18.2 percent-of the major articles in law reviews. At first blush, these
estimates seem in tension with the widespread belief, which we share,
that interdisciplinary scholarship has enjoyed substantial growth in re-
cent decades.36 On closer inspection, the tension is not as great as it ap-
pears. Figure 1 shows a slight upward trend in the incidence of empirical
articles in law reviews. There is some variability over the decade, but the
rate of empirical articles rises from slightly more than five percent in
2000 to about ten percent in 2010. Still, the low incidence of empiricism
even at the end of the decade may surprise critics who believe that legal
empirical studies is overdone.37 An important caveat is our classification
scheme does not encompass nontechnical interdisciplinary work. As de-
scribed above, we suspect our coding of humanities-oriented scholarship
undercounts some, perhaps much, of that scholarship. In addition, our
coding scheme simply does not incorporate nontechnical law and eco-
nomics. For example, an article applying economic analysis without a
formal mathematical model is not counted in our measures of interdisci-
plinary methodologies. Our measures are confined to instances of for-
36. See George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of
the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1993); Robert B.
Thompson, Corporate Law Criteria: Law's Relation to Private Ordering, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 95, 97
(2005) ("The most dramatic change in law teaching over the last generation has been the growth of
interdisciplinary scholarship.").
37. Brian Leiter, On So-Called "Empirical Legal Studies" and Its Problems, BRIAN LEITER'S L.
sCH. REP. (July 06, 2010, 6:41 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-
empirical-legal-studies.html.
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mal modeling or empiricism. According to these metrics, law review ar-
ticles infrequently apply more technical interdisciplinary methods.
Table 1 shows other differences in the types of law review publica-
tions. Major articles tend to be longer than student notes, book reviews,
and tributes. Page lengths are expressed in natural logarithms in order to
place less weight on a few extremely long articles. In log terms, major
articles are slightly longer. In actual pages, the average major article is
sixty pages, and the average length of the other categories of publication
is only forty-one pages. This difference is consistent with the common
observation that tributes, book reviews, and student pieces tend to be
shorter than major articles. Although not shown in Table 1, coauthor-
ship implies no difference in the average page length of major articles,
but the median length of coauthored articles is two pages shorter.
Another difference between major articles and other pieces is that
major articles are much more likely to appear first in the "running order"
of printed issues. When a law review dedicates an entire issue to a sym-
posium, a symposium piece necessarily occupies the lead position. Trib-
utes and memorials often appear at the beginning of law review issues.
The data shows that, consistent with conventional understanding, student
notes and book reviews virtually never lead an issue. In these data, stu-
dent notes never appear first in the issues.
Major articles are also far more likely to be cited. Column (2) of
Table 1 shows that the typical major article is cited on average nearly two
times per year. In contrast, other forms of law review publication receive
only fractional citations per year. The typical tribute is cited on average
.04 times per year, the typical student note is cited .20 times per year, and
the typical book review .46 times per year. Even articles appearing in
symposiums are cited only once per year on average, which is nearly half
of the citations of the "regular" or typical major law review article.
In addition to these differences, there are several dimensions across
which major articles and the other categories of publication are similar.
Given the manner in which the data was assembled, it is unsurprising
that the average age of articles is the same across the two samples. Per-
haps most interestingly, Table 1 shows that their distribution across legal
subjects is almost identical. An important caveat is that our topical cod-
ing was relatively crude. More than half the articles ended up in the
"public law" category. Nevertheless, the inclusion of student notes, book
reviews, symposiums, and tributes does not alter the distribution of law
review publications by topic. Other than public law, which we suspect is
something of a catchall category, private and commercial law was the
most popular topic, accounting for roughly twenty percent of the items
published. Criminal law represented another ten percent. Despite their
popularity during the past decade, corporate and international law ac-
count for a little more than ten percent of the published items.
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FIGURE 2:
VARIATION ACROSS MAJOR LAW REVIEWS
IN COAUTHORSHIP AND EMPIRICISM, 2000-2010
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We also observed substantial variation across law reviews in the
rates at which they publish coauthored and empirical work. Figure 2
shows that the fraction of major articles that were coauthored and empir-
ical by law review. University of Chicago (Chicago) led the way on both
fronts. The share of its major articles that were coauthored (thirty-three
percent) was more than twice that of New York University (NYU) (thir-
teen percent). In fact, Chicago exceeded by nearly ten percentage points
the next top venue for coauthorships (University of Pennsylvania
(Penn)). With regard to empiricism, the differences were also substan-
tial. The widest gap was between Chicago, with seventeen percent of
major articles empirical, and Georgetown, with around two percent of
articles empirical.
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FIGURE 3:
COAUTHORSHIP AND METHODOLOGY AT MAJOR LAW REVIEWS,
2000-2010
A. FRACTION OF MAJOR ARTICLES
Empirical
Mathematical
Theoryd Humanities
B. FRACTION OF MAJOR COAUTHORED ARTICLES
An initial inspection of the law review data provides some support
for the prediction of a correlation between collaboration and interdisci-
plinarity. Figure 3 shows the relationship between coauthorship and the
use of interdisciplinary methodologies. Panel A repeats in visual form
the information about major articles in column (2) of Table 1, and Panel
B shows the distribution of methodology in major articles that are coau-
thored. The pie charts reveal that the median coauthored article em-
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ploys no special methodology, but it is much more likely to be empirical
than a sole-authored article. The rate of empiricism among coauthored
articles is 21.6% in contrast to 9.4% among all major articles. The frac-
tion of formal models also rises slightly-5.2% from 3.5%. It suggests
that articles presenting formal models are more likely to be coauthored
than the traditional law review article but less likely to be coauthored
than an empirical article. In contrast, the presence of humanities meth-
odologies is lower among coauthored articles (2.6% versus 5.2% in the
full sample). This pattern is consistent with the low rate of coauthorship
in the humanities. 38
B. Determinants of Coauthorship
The summary statistics show an upward trend in coauthorship, and
to a lesser degree, empiricism in major law reviews. They also reveal
that empirical articles are far more likely to be coauthored. To assess
whether these relationships persist after controlling for other influences,
we turn to regression analysis. As described above, we estimate a series
of probit models in which the dependent variable is whether the article is
coauthored or not. The independent variables include the meth-
odological approach, the log of the length of the article, average number
of cites per year since publication, and several measures of the qualities
of the article including the subject, article type, and placement in the
journal. The results are laid out in Table 2. The table reports marginal
effects, rather than coefficients, in order to ease interpretation of the es-
timates. The first two columns analyze the complete sample of all ar-
ticles published. The last two columns only analyze major articles. To
account for the observed time trend we described in Part IV.A, we esti-
mate two models for each sample: one including a time trend and the
other including fixed effects for the number of years since publication.
All equations also include fixed effects for each law review.39
38. See supra Part II.B.
39. Although not reported in the tables, the coefficients for the law reviews are jointly significant
with p-values less than .05 in all equations in Tables 2 and 4.
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TABLE 2:
PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON NUMBER OF MULTIPLE-AUTHORED
ARTICLES IN TOP FIFTEEN LAW REVIEWS
Empirical
Formal Theory
Humanities
(Log) Page Length
Average Citations
Per Year
First in Volume
First in Issue
Tribute
Symposium
Book Review
Student Note or
Comment
Criminal Law
(1)
.163**
(.022)
.030*
(.019)
-.024**
(.010)
.009**
(.004)
.011**
(.002)
.035**
(.019)
.001
(.008)
-.043**
(.008)
.007
(.006)
-.018**
(.007)
-.132**
(.006)
-.036**
(.008)
(3)
.255**
(.033)
.067
(.047)
-.046
(.034)
-.016
(.013)
.021**
(.004)
.039
(.039)
-.003
(.021)
(2)
.164**
(.022)
.029*
(.018)
-.023**
(.010)
.009**
(.004)
.011**
(.002)
.035**
(.019)
.001
(.008)
-.043**
(.008)
.007
(.006)
-.018**
(.007)
-.132**
(.006)
-.036**
(.008)
(4)
.256**
(.033)
.066
(.047)
-.044
(.034)
-.016
(.013)
.022**
(.004)
.041
(.039)
-.005
(.021)
-.104**
(.026)
continued on next page
-.107**
(.025)
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TABLE 2-Continued
International/ -.040** -.039** -.099*** -.096***
Comparative Law (.007) (.007) (.028) (.029)
Private/ -.024** -.022** -.043 -.042
Commercial Law (.008) (.009) (.030) (.030)
Public Law -.045** -.043** -.119** -.118**
(.011) (.011) (.032) (.032)
Time Trend .005** -- .021** --
(.001) (.004)
Publication Year Fixed Yes Yes
Effects?
Major Articles Only? Yes Yes
N 7540 7540 2785 2785
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regres-
sions also include fixed effects for law reviews. The omitted category of topic is corporate
and securities law. Standard errors are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statis-
tical significance at the ten percent level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the five
percent level.
The results are largely consistent with our predictions and the pat-
terns seen in the summary statistics. The estimates show a strong corre-
lation between coauthorship and the presence of empirical analysis in an
article. In the full sample, when an article is empirical, the likelihood it is
coauthored is higher by sixteen percentage points, and for major law re-
view articles, the likelihood is twenty-six percentage points higher. The
estimates for other forms of interdisciplinary work are weaker. In the
full sample, articles with formal models have a higher probability of
coauthorship by three percentage points, and for humanities-oriented ar-
ticles, the probability is lower by about two percentage points. When the
sample is limited to major articles, these differences become slightly larg-
er in magnitude, but they remain much smaller than the effect of empiri-
cism. At most, the presence of a formal model implies a difference in the
likelihood of coauthorship of seven percentage points, and humanities
implies a difference of less than five percentage points. Because the es-
timates for formal theory and humanities are less precise in the smaller
sample, they lose statistical significance. The results are consistent with
the idea that empirical analysis of law provides strong opportunities for
collaboration, stronger than other forms of interdisciplinary work such as
formal modeling or humanities.
The probit regressions in Table 2 also include several explanatory
variables that might be considered rough proxies for an article's quali-
ty-its placement in the running order of an issue and the number of ci-
tations it subsequently receives. It is difficult to obtain reliable measures
of an article's quality because evaluations of scholarly merit are often
subjective. Therefore, the measures we employ come largely from aca-
demic lore. It is sometimes said that prestige attaches to an article's ap-
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pearing first in a volume. The estimates in Table 2 imply that articles
leading off a volume are about four percentage points more likely to be
coauthored, but the effect is statistically insignificant when the sample is
limited to major articles. Articles that appear first in other issues of a
volume are no more or less likely to be coauthored.
A second measure of quality is the number of citations an article
subsequently receives. This measure is inadequate for many reasons. A
citation may be given in order to criticize rather than praise an article. A
superfluous citation may be given to a friend, or a deserving citation may
be denied to an adversary. One may give citations to one's own prior
work to boost its prominence. Despite these and other distortionary
practices, a literature analyzing citations and interpreting them as an ar-
ticle's quality or influence has developed.4 0 We follow that literature in
controlling for citations, and Table 2 shows that the average number of
citations an article receives per year correlates positively with coauthor-
ship. The estimated effect, however, is small. Taking the largest esti-
mate in Table 2, a doubling of the average number of annual citations for
a major article from 1.9 to 3.8 would imply only an 8.4 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of coauthorship. On the whole, these measures
suggest that empiricism has a stronger bearing on coauthorship than
quality.
The subject matter of coauthored work also correlates closely with
the incidence of coauthorship. The omitted category is corporate/
securities law, and the negative estimates on the indicator variables for
other subjects imply that articles on these topics are less likely to be
coauthored than corporate and securities articles. The magnitudes of
these correlations are relatively modest. The largest-a decline of about
twelve percentage points for the average public law article-is smaller
than the effect of empiricism. When the sample is restricted to major ar-
ticles, the estimate for private law loses statistical significance. We sus-
pect that corporate/securities law is not uniquely complex or technical,
compared with our other subject categories. Rather, empiricism corre-
lates with subject areas. Only corporate and private law articles were
more likely to be coauthored than singly authored. Other subject cate-
gories were less likely to be coauthored.
The positive estimate for the time trend in columns (1) and (3) sug-
gests that the likelihood of articles in top law reviews being coauthored is
rising, even after controlling for other characteristics of the article. The
estimate from the subsample of major articles in column (3) implies that
the probability a major article is coauthored rises by ten percentage
points every five years, which is a sharper upward movement than was
evident in Figure 1. Movements over time in likelihood of collaboration
may be nonlinear, and for that reason, the equations in columns (2) and
40. See, e.g., Ayres & Vars, supra note 29; Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and
Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998).
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(4) replace the time trend with the more flexible fixed effects for years of
publication. The coefficients on the fixed effects for publication years
were jointly significant (with p-values less than .05), and this replacement
has virtually no effect on the other estimates for other variables.
TABLE 3:
PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON NONALPHABETICAL ORDERING OF
COAUTHORS IN ARTICLES IN TOP FIFTEEN LAW REVIEWS
Empirical
Formal Theory
Humanities
(Log) Page Length
Average Citations
Per Year
First in Volume
First in Issue
Tribute
Symposium
Book Review
Student Note or
Comment
Time Trend
.028
(.035)
-.065
(.055)
-.067
(.074)
.002
(.020)
-.007
(.007)
.063
(.079)
-.052
(.031)
.318*
(.206)
.046
(.032)
-.024
(.056)
.148
(.206)
-.008*
(.005)
.028
(.035)
-.062
(.055)
-.089
(.065)
-.005
(.020)
-.007
(.007)
.051
(.079)
-.050
(.037)
.259
(.215)
.040
(.032)
-.023
(.055)
.087
(.196)
.082**
(.043)
-.007
(.073)
.045
(.109)
.018
(.028)
-.003
(.007)
-.040
(.056)
-.020
(.039)
.081**
(.043)
-.008
(.073)
.028
(.103)
.014
(.027)
-.042
(.054)
-.042
(.054)
-.023
(.038)
-.006
(.005)
Publication Year Yes Yes
Fixed Effects?
Major Articles Yes Yes
Only?
N 913 913 560 560
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regres-
sions also include fixed effects for law reviews and for subject matter of the articles. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the
ten percent level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the five percent level.
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Table 3 reports the results from a test of the compensation theory,
or the idea that empirical articles are more likely to involve deviations
from the norm that author names are alphabetically ordered. The table
shows probit regressions on the probability that the sequence of authors'
names deviates from alphabetical ordering among coauthored articles.
Most of the estimates from the full data set are close to zero and statisti-
cally insignificant. Two exceptions are large point estimates for tributes
and student notes. Perhaps not much credence should be given to them
because they are based on a very small number of observations-only
eight tributes and only seven student notes in sample were coauthored.
The restriction of the sample to major law review articles does not
change most of the estimates. Although a few flip sign, they remain
modest in size and statistically insignificant. The exception here is the
estimate on empiricism. For major law review articles, empiricism is the
only covariate that is statistically significant predictor of reversal of au-
thor order. Moreover, its estimated effect, eight percentage points, is
enormous relative to the baseline rate of nonalphabetic orderings for ma-
jor, coauthored articles: sixteen percent. The estimate implies that the
rate of deviating from an alphabetic ordering is roughly fifty percent
higher for empirical coauthored articles as for other types of coauthor-
ships. Interestingly, this pattern does not appear attributable to the im-
portation of different crediting practices from other disciplines. PhD
economists are responsible for much of the recent empirical legal studies,
and alphabetic ordering has long been the norm in economics. More-
over, the estimates for formal theory and humanities do not predict siza-
ble or statistically significant differences in name sequencing. The rela-
tionship between empiricism and deviations from alphabetical name or-
der does not appear to reflect the migration of different credit
conventions from other disciplines. While further investigation is neces-
sary, the results for nonalphabetic ordering are consistent with a high
demand for empirical skill commanding a high compensation, though
there may be other explanations for the pattern.
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V. PEER-REVIEWED LEGAL JOURNALS
A. Summary Data
In this Section, we compare the qualities of articles published in the
JLS and JLEO with major articles published in law reviews. The analy-
sis includes all articles published in the ILS and JLEO. Unlike law re-
views, these faculty-edited journals do not publish student notes, book
reviews, or tributes, but they occasionally publish symposiums. To make
our results as comparable as possible to the results for law reviews, we
present estimates for these journals both with and without symposiums.
Symposium pieces compose about twenty percent of the articles pub-
lished in these journals over these years. As the results demonstrate, the
inclusion of symposium articles has little effect on the observed patterns.
TABLE 4:
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON ARTICLES IN JLS AND JLEO, 1989-2010
All Articles Major Articles Only
(1) (2)
Coauthored .464 .496
(.499) (.500)
Empirical .286 .313
(.452) (.464)
Formal Theory .398 .466
(.490) (.499)
Both Formal Theory and .074 .085
Empirics (.261) (.278)
(Log) Page Length 3.153 3.216
(.500) (.396)
Average Citations 1.381 1.301
Per Year (2.447) (1.737)
First in Volume .047 .051
(.213) (.212)
First in Issue .052 .051
(.223) (.212)
Symposium .199
(.400)
Number of Figures 1.608 1.662
(2.618) (2.420)
Appendices .372 .428
(.484) (.495)
Corporate/Securities Law .080 .097
(.272) (.296)
continued on next page
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Table 4-Continued
Criminal Law .053 .065
(.225) (.247)
International/ .043 .030
Comparative Law (.202) (.171)
Private/ .320 .345
Commercial Law (.467) (.171)
Public Law .299 .300
(.458) (.458)
Other Topic .205 .163
(.404) (.370)
Time Trend 11.064 11.321
(6.161) (6.262)
N 1030 827
Note: The columns report means and in parentheses standard deviations. "Major Ar-
ticles" excludes symposium articles.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for this sample. There are sev-
eral contrasts with the law review sample that are immediately apparent:
these journals feature more collaborative work, more interdisciplinary
work, and more technical sophistication. Coauthored articles comprise
nearly half of the articles published in these journals during these two
decades. This is more than double the rate of coauthorship for major ar-
ticles in the top law reviews during the past decade.
With respect to technical methodologies, empirical articles account
for roughly thirty percent of the articles in these journals over this pe-
riod, which is about three times the rate in law reviews during the past
decade. More strikingly, articles involving formal models account for
forty percent or more of the articles in the faculty-edited journals, which
is an order of magnitude higher than in law reviews. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly for two journals focused on law and economics, humanities-
oriented articles were too rare to record as a separate category. Instead,
we noted when an article contained both a formal model and empirical
analysis. These articles, which are in a sense doubly interdisciplinary,
represent less than ten percent of the published pieces in these journals.
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FIGURE 4:
TRENDS IN METHODOLOGY AT JLEO AND ILS, 1989-2010
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Figure 4 shows the fluctuations over time in the mix of theory and
empirics in the peer-reviewed journals. In most years, theory was more
common than empirics, but both are well represented. The amount of
empirics in the journals has varied from year to year. For all of the atten-
tion that "empirical legal studies" has received, the figure does not show
a dramatic surge in the presence of empirical work in these journals.
Rather, empirical analyses have been a mainstay of these journals. Ar-
ticles containing both a formal model and empirical analysis were only a
small share of the publications throughout this period.
0.8
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FIGURE 5:
TRENDS IN METHODOLOGY AND COAUTHORSHIP
AT JLS AND JLEO, 1989-2010
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Figure 5 examines the relationship between technicality and coau-
thorship over time. It shows the movements in "nontechnical" articles,
which we define as articles that contain neither empirical work nor a
formal model. Over this period, these journals shifted sharply away from
nontechnical articles: the share declined from forty percent of articles at
the end of the 1980s to less than ten percent by 2005.41 In the last five
years, nontechnical articles have remained below ten percent of these
journals' published output. We believe this dramatic decline reflects the
"maturation" of law and economics. Early applications of economics to
law could make substantial progress by employing economic ideas at a
broad, conceptual level without technical nuance. As early contributions
were scrutinized or challenged, it became necessary to specify the precise
conditions under which particular results would be obtained, and more
formal modeling was necessary. Similarly, economic analysis of law gen-
erated a welter of predictions about the consequences of laws and statis-
tical testing of empirical predictions is necessarily technical. Another
factor is that, during the past twenty years, economics itself became more
technical in its models and empirics, and these methods migrated into
41. Figure 5 does not separately break out the trends for each journal. Yet, the data available on
JLS extends back to the 1970s, and in that data, it is apparent that the fall in nontechnical articles in
that journal is even more pronounced over the longer time period. In the 1980s, more than half of the
journal's articles were nontechnical under our definition, and that share falls with a few brief interrup-
tions until the end of our observation period in 2010.
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law and economics. Computing costs have declined sharply over his pe-
riod, and large datasets have become readily available on the internet.
Enormous amounts of data can now be handled at low cost. Off-the-
shelf statistical software permits application of sophisticated statistical
procedures with ease. All of these factors have spurred more elaborate
empirical analyses.
Nontechnical law and economics has not, of course, disappeared
from legal academia. For example, it remains a substantial portion of the
program at the annual American Law and Economics Association con-
ference, the leading venue for emerging work in the field. Rather, we
suspect that much of that work has migrated to law reviews.42
42. We did not code the law reviews for nontechnical law and economics because it would be
very difficult to identify such work from a brief inspection of the article.
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FIGURE 6:
COAUTHORSHIP AND METHODOLOGY AT JLS AND JLEO, 2000-2010
A. FRACTION OF MAJOR ARTICLES
B. FRACTION OF MAJOR COAUTHORED ARTICLES
As nontechnical work has vanished from these journals, technical
analyses and coauthorship have become more closely correlated. Figure
5 shows that for these journals, as nontechnical articles have become in-
creasingly rare, general trends in coauthorship are determined almost ex-
clusively by trends in coauthorship in the technical articles. Figure 6
steps back from the time series patterns and examines the relationship
between coauthorship and specific methodologies. Panel A repeats in
visual form the figures in column (2) of Table 4-the fraction of all major
articles by methodology. Panel B of Figure 6 shows the same fractions
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for coauthored articles. The contrast, not as pronounced as in Figure 3
for law reviews, has some differences. Empiricism accounts for a slightly
larger share of coauthored articles than all articles (thirty-six percent ver-
sus thirty-one percent) as do articles employing both formal models and
empirics (6.5 percent versus ten percent). In contrast, nontechnical ar-
ticles are much less likely to be coauthored. They account for fourteen
percent of all articles but only six percent of coauthored articles.
These features of the data make clear that growing technical sophis-
tication was a central trend in these journals. To capture this trend more
fully, we collected several additional proxies for the technical complexity
of articles. Table 4 shows that thirty-seven percent of all articles in these
two journals had at least one appendix, and they had on average 1.6 fig-
ures. Even nontechnical articles sometimes had figures, such as supply
and demand diagrams. 43 The average length of articles was twenty-five
pages which is considerably shorter than the fifty-five pages of the typical
law review article. In addition, symposium pieces in these journals aver-
aged about five pages shorter than the typical article. Average article
length rose slowly but steadily over this period. For example, in the first
five years of the 1990s, the average length was 23.3 pages, and in the last
five years of the 2000s, it was 28.7 pages. The lengthening of articles may
be another reflection of the rising degree of technicality or it may simply
indicate the maturation of law and economics. That is, more recent ar-
ticles have a larger body of existing work to confront and discuss as a
prelude to making their own contributions. While far from certain, the
slightly lower rate at which articles in these journals are cited (1.3 per
year versus 1.9 per year) may indicate that more technical work is less
accessible to a wide audience than is the typical law review article.
The distribution of articles across topics in the faculty-edited jour-
nals differed slightly from law reviews. The coding of subjects was not
fully comparable as we observed that the faculty-edited journals included
some articles that did not pertain to any specific area of law. Rather,
they were essentially economics articles. We coded these articles as
"other," and they represented about ten percent of the articles in these
journals. Private law subjects were more prevalent in the peer-reviewed
journals than law reviews, and the percentage of public law topics is
roughly half that in law reviews. These differences are consistent with
the close attention economic analysis of law has given to common law
subjects such as contracts.
43. Although not reported here in order to conserve space, we collected other metrics of tech-
nical complexity. For example, we found that empirical papers averaged 5.7 tables, and formal papers
averaged sixteen equations. Our confidence in the estimate of tables is greater than for equations.
Counting numbered equations was difficult because there was some inconsistency across articles in
whether every equation was numbered. This was especially true for game theoretic articles, which
while clearly technical, often did not number their equations.
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B. Determinants of Coauthorship
As with the analysis of law reviews, we also interrogate the deter-
minants of coauthorship, and we run a parallel set of probit regressions
on coauthorship and deviations of alphabetical name ordering among
coauthored pieces. The first two columns of each table report regression
results on the full sample of all articles published in these journals, and
the last two columns display results from a sample excluding symposium
pieces. The removal of the symposium pieces from the sample has no
material effect on the estimates. The estimates in columns (1) and (2)
show that after controlling for other factors, a symposium piece is about
as likely to be coauthored as a typical article. The point estimate for a
symposium piece is slightly negative but not statistically significant.
The estimates for methodology are not exactly comparable to those
for law reviews. For law reviews, articles not employing any special in-
terdisciplinary methodology were the omitted (or comparison) category.
For faculty-edited journals, the analogous category would be nontech-
nical articles. But the precipitous decline in nontechnical articles during
this period meant that there were very few observations in this group
during the last years of the sample. For that reason, articles with either
formal models or nontechnical articles constituted the omitted category
in Tables 5 and 6." The results show that relative to these groups, ar-
ticles with empirical work or with both formal modeling and empirics are
more likely to be coauthored. The difference ranges from fourteen to
eighteen percentage points, which is slightly smaller than the impact of
empiricism on major articles in law reviews. But it must be remembered
that the comparison group here includes articles with formal models, and
the overall average rate of coauthorship is much higher (forty-nine per-
cent versus twenty percent).
Additionally, these equations include two additional controls for
technical complexity. Estimates for both of those measures are positive
and statistically significant. They imply that a one standard deviation in-
crease in the number of figures in an article corresponds to a three per-
centage point increase in the probability the article is coauthored. More
importantly, the presence of an appendix to an article suggests a ten per-
centage point increase in the likelihood of coauthorship.
As with law reviews, the proxies for article quality provide mixed
results. Again, an article's page length does not correlate with coauthor-
ship. Average citations per year predict coauthorship, and the magni-
tude of the estimate is identical to that for law reviews. Oddly, the lead
44. Although not reported here due to space constraints, we also estimated the equations using
only nontechnical articles as the comparison group. The estimates for empirical articles and articles
containing both formal theory and empirics were even larger than those shown in Tables 5 and 6. Al-
so, articles with formal theory were more likely to be coauthored than nontechnical articles. These
results imply that, consistent with Figure 6, any article employing a technical methodology was more
likely to be coauthored than a nontechnical article.
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position in the second issue in a volume correlates strongly with coau-
thorship,45 but lead position in the first issue of the volume does not. Un-
like the law reviews, the subject matter of the articles does not predict
coauthorship. In contrast to the results for law reviews, the point esti-
mates for subject matter are generally smaller, possessing different signs,
and statistically insignificant. Lastly, Table 5 shows that as with law re-
views, there is an upward trend in coauthorships, even after controlling
for other factors. The size of the estimate is half as large as in the law re-
view sample. The flatter slope is perhaps not surprising as the average
rate of coauthorships for these journals was already much higher than
among law reviews.
TABLE5:
PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON NUMBER OF MULTIPLE-AUTHORED
ARTICLES IN JLS AND JLEO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Empirical .135** .142** .152** .161**
(.038) (.039) (.040) (.041)
Both Formal .145** .153** .165** .179**
Theory and (.065) (.063) (.063) (.063)
Empirics
(Log) Page Length .030 .025 .007 -.0002
(.038) (.039) (.050) (.051)
Average Citations .021** .021** .020** .020**
per Year (.009) (.009) (.012) (.012)
Number of Figures .023** .024** .013** .014**
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.008)
Appendices .113** .108** .098** .093**
(.036) (.037) (.038) (.039)
First in Volume .044 .041 . -.009 -.007
(.074) (.073) (.079) (.080)
First in Issue .167** .175** .145** .156**
(.072) (.071) (.078) (.077)
Symposium -. 061 -.064 -- --
(.045) (.049)
Criminal Law .046 .050 .073 .080
(.095) (.096) (.094) (.095)
International/ -.029 -.029 -.118 -.116
Comparative Law (.098) (.103) (.114) (.120)
continued on next page
45. These journals only have two regular issues per year.
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TABLE 5-Continued
Private/ -.044 -.047 -.005 -.019
Commercial Law (.070) (.072) (.074) (.076)
Public Law .003 .008 .032 .034
(.067) (.067) (.067) (.068)
Other Topic -.018 -.015 .005 .004
(.067) (.067) (.068) (.067)
Time Trend .012** -- .010** --
(.003) (.003)
Publication Year Yes Yes
Fixed Effects?
Major Articles Yes Yes
Only?
N 1030 1030 827 827
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regres-
sions also include fixed effects for law reviews. The omitted category of topic is corporate
and securities law. Standard errors are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statis-
tical significance at the ten percent level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the five
percent level.
TABLE 6:
Probit Regressions on Nonalphabetical Ordering of
Coauthors in Articles in ILS and JLEO
Empirical
Both Formal
Theory and
Empirics
(Log) Page Length
Average Citations
Per Year
Number of Figures
Appendices
First in Volume
(1)
.070**
(.035)
.018
(.054)
.002
(.039)
-.004
(.004)
-.001
(.004)
.020
(.029)
-.079
(.031)
(2)
.095**
(.041)
.046
(.068)
.009
(.044)
-.004
(.004)
-.003
(.005)
.005
(.003)
-.093
(.027)
(3)
.069**
(.035)
.023
(.056)
.003
(.048)
.004
(.010)
.001
(.005)
.041
(.031)
(4)
.107**
(.043)
.041
(.067)
.009
(.054)
.007
(.010)
.004
(.007)
.025
(.035)
continued on next page
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TABLE 6-Continued
First in Issue -.020 -.005 -.069 -.077
(.049) (.060) (.043) (.045)
Symposium .150** .127** -- --
(.064) (.066)
Time Trend -.007** -- .007** --
(.002) (.002)
Publication Year Yes Yes
Fixed Effects?
Major Articles Yes Yes
Only?
N 479 479 389 389
Note: The columns report marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. Regres-
sions also include fixed effects for law reviews and for the subject matter of the articles.
Standard errors are clustered on articles. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at
the ten percent level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the five percent level.
Table 6 tests the compensation theory for the faculty-edited jour-
nals. Again, the dependent variable is whether the coauthors deviate
from an alphabetical sequencing of names. Only two variables appear to
have any impact on this ordering. As in law reviews, empirical articles in
the faculty-edited journals were substantially more likely to depart from
the alphabetical norm. The rate at which the average coauthored article
did not follow alphabetical ordering was seven to eleven percentage
points higher than in the comparison group. This difference represents a
very substantial increase because on average only twelve percent of
coauthored (nonsymposium) articles did not have alphabetical ordering.
Interestingly, the estimates for articles containing both theory and empir-
ics are smaller (two to four percentage points) and not statistically signif-
icant. The other significant predictor in these regressions was whether
the article was a symposium piece. The estimate reflects the fact that
twenty-five percent of coauthored symposium pieces in the sample did
not have alphabetical ordering. Why this is so, is left for future investiga-
tion.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Coauthorship, we have demonstrated, is on the rise, as earlier anal-
yses have suggested. In keeping with theories of complementarity, it ap-
pears that coauthorship is a response to increasingly technical demands
in scholarship, as it is found most frequently in the peer-reviewed jour-
nals, then in major law review articles, and less frequently observed in
lower-status work in law reviews including book reviews, student notes,
and symposium pieces. We have also demonstrated that empirical and
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interdisciplinary work, with their increasingly sophisticated meth-
odologies, are driving much of the coauthorship trend.
We have not directly addressed the normative implications of the
trend toward coauthorship in legal academia. To the extent coauthor-
ship is driven by the empirical turn in legal scholarship, it will be subject
to many of the criticisms directed at that movement. Professor Brian
Leiter has recently questioned the trend, even challenging the use of the
term "empirical legal studies."46 If, as our analysis suggests, coauthored
empirical work is more technically sophisticated (as demonstrated
through more figures and appendices in peer-reviewed journals), then
there is a risk that it will be more difficult for traditional legal academics
to understand. At the same time, our finding about citation counts indi-
cate the possibility that coauthored work is of higher quality or has
greater scholarly influence. A full analysis of the consequences of coau-
thorship is beyond the scope of this paper. But a finding that coauthored
work is of higher quality would be consistent with our analysis and could
help parry the complaint that interdisciplinary work, especially empiri-
cism, is inaccessible to traditional legal scholars.
Another challenge associated with coauthorship is the assignment
of credit among authors. This is a difficult issue for tenure committees,
academic administrators, and other consumers of academic research.
Yet, our evidence on name order reversal suggests that those doing em-
pirical work, in particular, are better able to make the division clear.
This may result from the importation of norms from other disciplines, or
the fact that empirical authors are more likely to insist on more credit for
their specialized skills. It may also be the case that the division of labor
is more transparent in coauthored empirical work than in other kinds of
scholarship. One author typically takes the lead in any quantitative em-
pirical analysis, and so the precise division among coauthors is clearer.
This may be particularly true when readers already know the disciplinary
skill set of the collaborators.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have provided an economic theory of coauthorship that empha-
sizes the crucial role of complementarity, as well as compensation, credit
diminution, and other factors, in driving the decision to coauthor. Com-
plementarity is affected by the labor market for academics, but also by
technological advances that allow for increasingly sophisticated technical
work. The prior literature documented the trend to coauthorship is
greatest in disciplines like economics and the hard sciences and much
slower in humanistic scholarship in which the tools of research have not
been affected by technological developments. We show that within law,
coauthorship is driven by empirical and interdisciplinary work that is it-
46. See Leiter, supra note 37.
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self influenced by outside fields and relies on the same tools that push
coauthorship generally. The trend toward more interdisciplinary work,
especially empirical work, appears to have driven the trend toward more
collaboration in law. This pattern is evident in the top fifteen law re-
views. It appears even more pronounced in two leading faculty-edited
journals in which nontechnical scholarship has nearly disappeared. Em-
pirical scholars also seem better able to resolve some of the problems of
credit assignment that have been identified as one of the risks of coau-
thorship. While we do not directly address the quality of coauthored
work, our analysis is consistent with collaboration producing more so-
phisticated and influential scholarship, and if this is so, we expect the
trend to intensify in years to come.
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